Introduction
In the context of European integration, Sweden and Finland are often perceived as natural allies, based on their shared Nordic heritage, established historical ties, cultural and ideological similarities, their abstention from joining NATO and their concurrent accession to the European Union (EU) in 1995. Together with Denmark, they are often referred to as the EU's "Scandinavians" (sic) or the "Nordic member states" although some argue that there is limited evidence for any sort of Nordic bloc or Scandinavian convergence within the EU (e.g. Bonnén and Søsted 2003; Ojanen 2002 Ojanen , 2007 . 1 This article argues that assumptions over a Swedish-Finnish tandem within the EU can be challenged by looking at the bilateral relationship in some cases, not so much because the two member states do not openly cooperate or coordinate their positions on a regular basis but because they are in a state of "soft competition" with each other also in policy areas where cooperation would bring about benefits for both of them. Finland have a natural shared interest in promoting a Northern European agenda in the context of EU regional policies, and that their positions are likely to converge at the EU level on the basis of historical ideological and cultural ties. Although sub-regional cooperation has been an affiliative matter between Sweden and Finland for decades, the two states do not join forces in promoting regional issues in the framework of the EU.
Apart from not cooperating on seminal issues, they compete with each other and thus forge unilateral agendas rather than adopting a common stance on issues surrounding their immediate geographic neighbourhood. This kind of competition remains "soft" in the sense that national initiatives of either of the two states do not openly oppose policy proposals and endeavours of the other. As will be shown in this article, however, competition is a crucial pattern in the way Sweden and Finland have positioned themselves as member states in regional matters of the European North.
The most significant policy in this context is the EU's Northern Dimension (ND), which has been launched in 1997 upon a Finnish initiative. The EU's ND is distinctly aimed at dealing with all external relations issues that concern the European North, and thus, covers the main geopolitical focus area of both Sweden and Finland. The main contention of this article is that over the past two decades, Sweden and Finland have not cooperated but competed in this sub-regional matter although this is a policy area in which they could be expected to be likely to cooperate if not converge when it comes to the promotion of a Northern European agenda at the European level.
How could an EU policy that directly furthers Northern Europe like the EU ND potentially be a controversial matter among these two EU member states? One might expect that they could have had divergent views on how to design the EU's ND, which policy areas to include or which instruments to adopt for its implementation. The divergences, however, were of a more fundamental nature: Finland openly favoured a comprehensive EU framework for sub-regional matters and thus promoted the ND proactively while Sweden preferred to focus on existing sub-regional structures and the involvement of third actors, leaving any references to the EU aside. While Finland sought to secure EU involvement in the wider BSR at an early stage, Sweden paid a lot of attention to the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), keeping EU institutions and policy makers in Brussels at a distance. As a result, to this day, Sweden's involvement in the development and implementation of the EU's ND has at best been reluctant although the policy clearly overlaps with Swedish core interests and could serve Sweden in this regard. Instead of supporting Finland with the advancement of the ND framework as a sort of win-win situation for both countries, Sweden sought to draw up a distinct sub-regional agenda for the BSR that neither sought to complement or refer to the very similar Finnish initiative within the EU. After the change of government in 2009, Sweden initiated a separate initiative for the BSR at the EU level, thereby directly counteracting Finnish ambitions to strengthen the existing ND. These Swedish efforts have recently found acknowledgement with the launch of an "EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region" (European Commission 2009), which is related to yet formally detached from the ND that Finland has been promoting for more than a decade. As this article will show, the BSR Strategy also builds on a different, less formalized governance model than the ND, which supports the argument that Sweden and Finland are promoting divergent approaches to furthering sub-regional cooperation.
This has arguably also affected the leverage each country was able to achieve with their sub-regional initiatives.
What lies at the heart of the analysis of this bilateral relationship is the question what impact EU membership has had on their conduct as states and as sub-regional stakeholders in the BSR. This article builds on the assumption that multi-level politics as we find them in the EU create "new options for domestic actors in their choice of allies and policies" (Sandholtz 1996, 404 The following section will briefly outline the historical development of the SwedishFinnish relationship against the background of their joint Nordic heritage since this is commonly seen as one of the main conditioning factors of their sub-regional policies.
Before then turning to the case of the ND and the Swedish BSR initiative more specifically, the analytical framework will be presented.
Sweden and Finland: Competitors or Partners?
As EU member states with a shared history and strong cultural and ideological ties, Sweden and Finland are frequently seen in tandem. Based on a number of perceived similarities, their concurrent accession to the EU and their shared Nordic heritage, they are rarely seen as competitors or proponents of diverging points of view (e.g. Jakobsen 2009, 93). Their alignment both within and outside the EU, over sub-regional issues surrounding Northern Europe in particular, is often rather taken as a given. 4 In most cases, they are lumped together on the basis of the long-established conception of "Nordic cooperation" and the way this is seen to have determined their sub-regional positions and interests (e.g. Bulmer and Lequesne 2005) . In International Relations scholarship, the "Nordics" (sic) have been recognized as a reasonably homogenous cultural and ideological bloc for a long time, a "security community" (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998) Iceland, Sweden and Norway -started to harmonise their legislation and agreed on a set of common legal principles (Wendt 1981, 11) . Nordic Cooperation reached its first zenith in the course of World War I when it started to extend into new policy areas. To many international observers at the time, the Nordic sub-region appeared much like a "single socio-political and economic unit" (Bonnén and Søsted 2003, 22) rather than a group of individual states.
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Throughout the Cold War, the five took fairly different routes in terms of international cooperation, particularly as Iceland, Denmark and Norway had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Sweden and Finland instead decided to become neutral. Building on their shared normative foundations, however, the group still managed to develop a unique security political identity which was later referred to as constituting a "Nordic balance" in the face of bipolar confrontation (Lodgaard 1992, 283) . As Dahl (1997) put it, they formed "something of a regional quilt of complementary strategic choices" (175). Regardless of their international affiliations, they all pursued a policy of moderation, essentially by seeking to contain Soviet involvement in Finland and US involvement in Norway (Laursen and Olesen 2000, 67) .
With their 'third way', they managed to evade total entrapment in the bipolar superstructure (Wiberg and Waever 1992, 23) (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) . Neorealists also underlined the importance of geo-strategic considerations (Mouritzen 1998) and of concerns about disproportionate gains (Grieco 1988) , which motivate states to capitalize on arising forms of cooperation in a strategic way. Liberal Institutionalists place the emphasis on the impact of international institutions (Baldwin 1993) , looking closely at the functions states and domestic actors ascribe to their membership (Keohane et al. 1993 ) and which adaptational strategies they employ. Looking at potentially diverging interests between Sweden and Finland can thus add to our understanding of why their bilateral relationship has changed since their accession to the EU. An analytical engagement with the normative foundations of their conduct as member states (different identities) in turn reflects the constructivist approach to International Relations and the concern with aspects of ideology and role conception (Wendt 1992) . Here the emphasis is not so much on structural changes but more on how these are perceived on the basis of certain cultural but also strategic predispositions. Schumacher's (2000) argument of deliberate non-cooperation as a joint Swedish-Finnish strategy spans across structuralist, liberal institutionalist and constructivist perspectives alike, suggesting that cooperation has indeed taken place between the two countries but with a focus on desired ends rather than on joint actions.
The following section will discuss each of these explanations in detail, which should serve as as a starting point to determine the extent to which these contribute to our understanding of the Swedish-Finnish relationship in the context of sub-regional matters.
Systemic Changes
For the purpose of this study, which focuses on the conduct of Sweden and Finland as EU member states and stakeholders in the BSR, Nordic cooperation and the way it has developed remains an important point of reference. A number of scholars have argued that the affiliative sub-regional framework that had dominated both Swedish and Finnish sub-regional agendas for a long time has been affected by systemic changes in the international arena (Barnes 1998; Browning 2007; Joenniemi 1997; Jukarainen 1999; Mouritzen 1995; Simoulin 1999) , with regards to e.g. globalization (Barnes 1998) but particularly in the context of European and transatlantic integration (Archer 1996; Bonnén and Søsted 2003; Dahl 1997; Inbar and Sheffer 1997; Ingebritsen 1998 More specifically, the geostrategic position of Sweden and Finland during the years preceding their accession to the EU had been ambivalent for both countries. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War removed the great power overlay and opened up a wider range of policy options for both states. On the other hand, they were also pushed to take major geopolitical decisions after a sustained period of systemic limitation. Europeanist" (Ojanen 2005, 408) . Sweden in turn first seemed to be pulled into a deep socio-economic and ideological crisis, which subsequently turned it into a fundamentally pro-European yet reluctant member state (Dahl 1997, 176) .
Nordic cooperation has lost its importance also in the broader context of international organizations, which highlights the more general impact systemic changes had on the international conduct of the Nordic states, and Sweden and Finland more specifically.
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Studies (Bonnén and Søsted 2003; Wiklund 2000) have shown that once Sweden and Finland had joined the EU, they started to adapt their voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly, for example, to the European mainstream whereas before, they had traditionally coordinated their positions to find a concerted Nordic solution (Bonnén and Søsted 2003, 26) .
Diverging Interests
Some have emphasised that diverging interests could explain non-cooperation of Nordic member states like Sweden and Finland within the EU (e.g. Ojanen 2005 ). This argument is closely related to the previous one. Systemic changes in the context of the breakdown of the Soviet Union have had an impact on the sort of priorities both Finland and Sweden set for their domestic, regional and international policies, and these partly strayed from the broad Nordic consensus which had dominated their agendas during the Cold War. These changes reflected their inherent ideological differences as well, so that their positions would ultimately diverge and move away from the old "third way". One of the most dominant aspects in this context is Finland's special relationship with Russia, which has affected any political step Finnish leaders have taken in the past two decades. Finland's interest in maintaining a constructive relationship with the Russian Federation is not reflected in the Swedish outlook on sub-regional and transnational matters. This article illustrates that even when Swedish and Finnish interests could be expected to be very similar or at least not fundamentally conflicting, such as in the case of furthering the stance of Northern Europe within the EU, the kind of policy solutions and institutional avenues each of them prefer still tend to diverge, which eventually leads to non-cooperation and competition.
Common Cultural Heritage but Different Identities
Another explanation for the absence of Swedish-Finnish cooperation within the EU is closely related to the arguments of systemic changes and diverging interests. Some argue that Sweden and Finland had always been fundamentally different in terms of their ideology and security identities, but that these differences only started to unfold after the end of the Cold War. Building on inherently different historical experiences and ideological foundations, Sweden and Finland also assign differing functions and meanings to their EU membership. What supports this line of argument is that, arguably, Finland and Sweden had different motives for joining the EU in the first place (Mouritzen 1993) . When deciding to join the EU, Sweden was driven by strong economic interests (Hadenius 2003, 219; Luif 1995, 216) while the Finnish debate was dominated by ideological motives (Ruhala 2004, 114) . For Finland, becoming an EU member was a lot about becoming part of the Western 'security community' (Arter 2000, 680) whereas for Sweden, the security-related aspects of membership were not at all decisive. For Finland, in turn, attitude towards accession was only partly determined by economic considerations (Arter 1999, 334) : joining the European family meant to return to sovereignty and normality after decades of political and ideological domination by Soviet Russia.
Another expectation was that full integration in the European project would help
Finland to meet other Nordic countries at eye level (Barnes 1998) 
Synthesis: Explanations for Non-Cooperation
Wrapping up, one can identify four major explanations for the non-cooperation of the Nordics within the EU: (1) systemic changes, (2) diverging interests, (3) ideological differences, (4) strategic deliberation not to cooperate.
For the case of Swedish-Finnish non-cooperation in the field of sub-regional matters it is expected that each of these explanations has some explanatory value. "goal-seeking" types of action but competition "strives to reduce the gains available to others" while cooperation would imply that states strive to generate "mutual gains" (Milner 1992, 8) . In line with this definition, this article argues that Sweden and Finland have not only disregarded the potential mutual gains of cooperating in sub-regional matters within the EU, they have embarked on a competitive strategy, which is likely to have affected the impact of the initiatives of either side.
Non-cooperation between Sweden and Finland and among the Nordic member states in general has received much more scholarly attention than has competition and rivalry. Russian element of the policy, however, was both help and hindrance. In the context of the policy's establishment in 1998, it was a crowd puller in Brussels, an argument that would even convince the Southern member states (Wessels 2000) . In the long run, however, as a motive, it superseded the de-centralised nature Lipponen had envisaged for the policy.
What is more, the actual policy document, the Communication of the European Commission on the creation of an EU ND, turned out to be fairly non-committal and unsubstantial. According to the official document (European Commission 1998), the ND "should not be seen as a new regional initiative" as this was not perceived to be "necessary", and regional assistance would only be provided "through existing programmes", following "existing procedures and within existing budgets" (pt. 10).
Observing this shifting tone, Browning (2005b) notes that the focus had "somewhat In the context of sub-regional issues within the EU, references to Sweden and Finland as some sort of "Nordic tandem" are much more common than, e.g. references to
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as the "Viségrad Group". This is partly because apart from their sub-regional heritage, Sweden and Finland also have other similarities as small non-aligned countries, which seems to raise expectations that their positions as member states will converge where interests overlap. 5 The analytical scope of this article does not allow for an extensive discussion of the creation and development of Nordic cooperation (see e.g. Thomas 1996) 6 A popular example for Nordic cooperation in the EU framework is the joint SwedishFinnish initiative of 1997 on the inclusion of Petersberg tasks in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Bonnén and Søsted (2003: 26) argue, however, that this initiative resulted mainly from the close personal relationship between then foreign ministers Lindh and Halonen as well as their "uniting social democratic background". There has been no reference to Nordic cooperation at any stage of the process. Given that "footnote member" Denmark was not part of the initiative, it could not be regarded as "Nordic" anyway. Also, it seemed more like a reactive if not defensive act after some member states had suggested the inclusion of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU framework. Later, Finland even turned out to be a keen supporter of military crisis management (Ojanen 2005: 407-8) .
It should be emphasized that at the sub-regional level, Nordic cooperation is still unparalleled in terms of its dynamism and concentration: civil servants, lobbying groups and businessmen meet on a regular basis, and countless cultural organizations maintain a tight network of cooperation and constructive involvement under the label of Nordic cooperation (Sundelius and Wiklund 2000, 327) .f However, instead of closing ranks in the relevant meetings, they appeared as individual members states, emphasizing mutually consistent yet different aspects without actively coordinating each other's positions beforehand (Tallberg 2002) .
10 A significant exception is provided by Herolf (2000) , who coined the notion of "constructive competition" to characterise the relationship between Sweden and Finland since their accession to the EU. Another scholar who frequently discussed divergence between Sweden and Finland against this background is Ojanen (2002, 2005, 2007) , who underlines the different and often conflicting role models the two states have adopted as members of the EU.
